Although the relationship between bank ownership and performance is the current focus of much research, this paper investigates the relationship between ownership and the prudential behavior of banks. Using Chinese data, I show that lending by state-owned banks has been less prudent than lending by joint-equity banks, but has improved over time. This is consistent with the hypothesis that accountability to shareholders and depositors gives joint-equity banks a better incentive than state-owned banks to engage in prudent lending, and with the hypothesis that the reform of the banking system has improved the incentive for state-owned banks to behave more prudently in their lending.
Introduction
Many countries have experienced the state ownership of banks at some point in their history, and some have experimented with the privatization of state-owned banks in recent decades. The relationship between bank ownership and performance is well studied in the literature, but the findings are mixed. Clarke et al. (2005) , for example, find that although some measures of bank performance have improved as a result of privatization, others have registered little change or may even have deteriorated. This may be explained by the fact that privatization usually takes a long time to yield gains, because more time may be required by management to overcome the organizational inertia and resistance to change that are common characteristics of newly privatized firms (Otchere, 2005) . Another possible reason is that bank performance measures are notoriously noisy, leading to less than robust results.
Using Chinese data, I attempt to investigate the effects of ownership on bank lending and prudential behavior. I compare state-owned banks and joint-equity banks in China, which together make up the main part of the Chinese banking sector.
Commercial banks are supposed to operate prudently, and failure to obey this basic rule may result in long-term disastrous outcomes, such as mounting non-performing loans and even closure. Hence, risk-taking behavior measures maybe better indicators of bank long-term improvement than short-term performance measures, such as annual returns. Moreover, risk-taking behavior can be much easier measurement than performance measures, especially in developing countries, like China. The identification of a difference in the level of risk-taking behavior between government-owned and privatized banks would provide strong evidence of the benefits of bank privatization. Nevertheless, despite the potential informativeness of this relationship, previous research seems to focus only on performance.
China's state-owned banks did not begin to be privatized until 2005, but joint-equity banks were in existence as early as 1986. As stock-holding companies, joint-equity banks have a different ownership structure than state-owned banks, but are quite similar to privatized state-owned banks on several counts. First, bank privatization in transition economies is usually organized by the government, and joint-equity banks in China were set up by the government. Second, governments often retain control over or a minority stake in privatized banks (Beck, Cull, and Jerome, 2005; Clarke et al., 2005) , and similarly in China most of the controlling shareholders of the joint-equity banks are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Thus, a study of the difference in the level of prudence between state-owned banks and joint-equity banks will contribute to the literature on privatization.
To identify whether joint-equity banks are likely to be more prudent than state-owned banks, I use portfolio allocation data, such as the bank excess reserves ratio, loan/asset ratio, and deposit/loan ratio as measures of bank prudence. The empirical results show that joint-equity banks tend to be significantly more prudent than state-owned banks, and regardless of the control variables that are used, the difference is significant at the one-percent level. Annual firm-level panel data and quarterly macro data show exactly the same pattern. In addition, the four state-owned banks in China have been carrying out reforms in line with the economic reform policy, and I find that they have become more prudent over the years as a result 1 .
The relationship between the constraints on corporate decision-makers and behavior that maximizes firm value is a popular topic in corporate governance research, but few studies focus on the way in which these constraints affect managerial risk taking. Yeung, Litov and John (2006) examine the relationship between investor protection and the incentive of corporate insiders to take value-enhancing risks. Studying the banking sector, Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) find stockholder-controlled banks to have an incentive to take greater risks than managerially controlled banks. Gorton and Rosen (1995) discuss the relationship between insider stock ownership and bank risk taking, and Berger and Udell (1994) , Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) , Milne (2002) , and Shrieves and Dahl (2003) focus on the relationship between risk-based capital regulation and bank portfolio choice (prudential behavior). However, all of these studies focus on private banks, and it was not until recently that scholars began to investigate prudential behavior and bank government ownership. Berger et al. (2005) test bank portfolio difference in Argentina in the 1990s, and although they find that banks did lend more prudently after privatization, this is not the main thrust of their research. Haber (2005) regards bank prudence as a negative, rather than a positive, sign of bank reform.
Why are joint-equity banks likely to be more prudent than state-owned banks?
One possible reason is that joint-equity banks have better corporate governance.
2 Berger et al. (2005) and others explicitly refer to bank ownership and performance as a corporate governance topic. State-owned banks, in contrast, are less monitored by their owners, as is the case with most SOEs. Alchian (1965) argues that all citizens can be considered SOE owners, but that as they have no way of selling their "share,"
the level of monitoring in the public sector is sub-optimal. Vining and Boardman (1992) further argue that the monitoring of SOEs is no more effective than in the private sector, and can in fact be worse. Furthermore, state-owned banks may be less subject to monitoring by depositors, because in a financial crisis they are more likely to be bailed out by the government, which gives depositors less inventive to pay attention to what is going on. Joint-equity banks, in contrast, are faced with a higher probability of bank runs, and thus maintain more reserves and lend less, which is a moral hazard issue. 3 The possibility of a takeover, such as the takeover in 2004 of the Shenzhen Development Bank by a foreign investor, also promotes efficient and prudent management behavior in joint-equity banks, a threat that does not exist for state-owned banks.
China has a very large banking sector, but has been largely ignored as a context 2 Unlike studies of US corporations, studies of governance in developing nations often focus on the role of ownership in reducing agency problems, because weak legal infrastructures often do not adequately protect investors (Berger et al., 2005) 3 As most controlling holders of joint-equity banks are SOEs, the difference in bailing out may not be serious. For example, when the Hainan Development Bank was closed in 1998 -the only joint-equity bank to do so -all of the deposit was guaranteed by the government.
for studies, such as on bank ownership and performance, 4 even though it is the largest of the transition economies. Chen, Li, and Moshirian (2005) studied ownership and performance in Chinese banking firms, but limited their investigation to the Bank of China in Hong Kong. The possible reason for the lack of research on the Chinese banking sector may be the scarcity and poor quality of the data, which are limited in availability and widely doubted in the areas of nonperforming loans, return on assets, and return on equity. 5 I have tried my best in this paper to minimize the effect of poor data on the quality of the research by hand-collecting most of the data and using bank assets and liability data to probe the differences in risk-taking behavior. Data that might be doubtful, such as non-performing loans, returns on assets, and returns on equity, are omitted from the empirical survey.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, it adds to the literature on the effect of ownership on the prudential behavior of banks and highlights that differences in the prudential behavior of banks provide an alternative to performance to test the effects of a change in bank ownership. Second, it is the first paper to study ownership and bank portfolio allocation using China as the background, and to report a significant difference in the level of prudence between state-owned banks and joint-equity banks. Third, differences in ownership structure notwithstanding, the difference in bank portfolio allocation between banks is an interesting topic, and this paper gives insight into the main reasons for this difference.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief introduction to the Chinese banking sector. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 presents the annual firm-level panel data regression results.
Section 5 provides the quarterly macro data regression results. Section 6 concludes the paper. All bank interest rates in China must be within a range that is designated by the PBOC, although this range has been substantially broadened of late. Furthermore, although founded in accordance with commercial banking law, banks in China must achieve a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8%, currently the ratios of both the state-owned and the joint-equity banks may be less than 8%. The only regulatory difference between the state-owned and joint-equity banks relates to credit control. Before 1998, the central banks controlled the credit of the state-owned banks by setting mandatory credit quotas, which did not apply to joint-equity banks. This might have led the state-owned banks to have higher excess reserves ratios, deposit/loan ratios, and lower loan/asset ratios, but in this paper I find lower excess reserves ratios and deposit/loan ratios and higher loan/asset ratios.
2.China's Banking Sector

3.Data and methodology
This paper I calculate three ratios of bank portfolio allocation as proxies for bank prudence:
bank excess reserves ratio, loan/asset ratio, and deposit/loan ratio. If a bank operates more prudently, then it will have larger excess reserves to safeguard against deposit runs, and will have a smaller liquidity risk. I use bank total deposit times required reserves ratio to calculate the required reserves, and then calculate excess reserves by subtracting the required reserves from the bank reserves. I then divide bank excess reserves by total deposits to calculate the bank excess reserves ratio. other assets were not reported in the balance sheet. Thus I delete other assets from total assets to make the data more comparable. The deposit/loan ratio is quite close to the loan/asset ratio as a proxy of prudence, and prudential banks are likely to disburse fewer loans based on the same deposits, where deposit and loan are defined as before.
There are other proxies that are commonly used in studying the behavior of commercial banks. Shrieves and Dahl (2003), Berger and Udell (1994) use loan and asset growth and Gorton and Rosen (1995) use the ratio of non-performing loans to estimate the risk of a bank portfolio. Other possible proxies of bank prudence are loan structure and the standard deviation of the bank firm stock returns. China's joint-equity banks first emerged in 1986 and the last of the 10 that are included in this sample was founded in 1996, and thus the loans of the joint-equity banks grow from a starting point of 0. Although prudent banks tend to have lower loan growth rate, a higher loan and asset growth rate cannot be regarded as a proxy for imprudence. The ratio of non-performing loans, as mentioned, suffers from serious data quality problems. Chinese banking statistics fail to provide enough loan structure data. As only five banks went public before 2004, the standard deviation of stock returns cannot be used.
Based on the macro quarterly data, Figure 1 shows the difference in bank excess reserves ratio, loan/asset ratio, and deposit/loan ratio between the state-owned banks and joint-equity banks. Although all three variables changed over the sample period, a significant difference between the state-owned and joint-equity banks can be discerned. The bank excess reserves ratios and deposit/loan ratios of the state-owned banks are lower than those of the joint-equity banks, whereas the loan/asset ratios of the state-owned banks are higher than those of the joint-equity banks, which coincides with my hypotheses. The state-owned banks improved in all three aspects over the sample period, which demonstrates the positive effect of bank reform. However, I am cautious of coming to the conclusion that there is a difference in the level of prudence, as this may be caused by other variables, such as different sources of funds.
To test whether there is difference in the level of prudence between the state-owned and joint-equity banks, I use the following basic regression model:
Bank prudence measures = α+β 1 * Bank dummy+β 2 * List dummy, +β 3 * GDP growth+β 4 * Interest rate measures, +β 5 *Bank fund source measures+β 6 * Bank assets +β 7 *Regulatory measures, +β 8 * State-owned bank* Time + Error term.
The dependent variables are the bank prudence measures, that is, bank excess reserves ratio, loan/asset ratio, and deposit/loan ratio.
I use a bank dummy to capture the difference in prudence between the state-owned and joint-equity banks, in which the state-owned banks are assigned the value 0 and the joint-equity banks are assigned the value 1. I hypothesize that the joint-equity banks will be more prudential, and will thus have a higher bank reserves ratio, a lower loan/asset ratio, and a higher deposit/loan ratio. Managers and directors of Chinese joint-equity banks rarely hold stocks from their own bank, and insiders hold no stocks in four of the five listed banks. Non-listed joint-equity banks do not usually produce annual reports, and thus insufficient data on large shareholders could be collected.
Thus, rather than inside and outside equity, I use a list dummy to determine whether listing on the stock exchange makes a bank behave more prudently. A listed bank is assigned the value 1, and non-listed banks are assigned the value 0.
I control other variables to better understand the effect of the bank dummy. As bank prudential behavior is rarely studied, these variables are interesting in themselves. The first control variable is GDP growth. When the economy is growing faster, banks tend to hold smaller reserves and disburse more loans, which should entail a smaller bank excess reserves ratio, a higher loan/asset ratio, and a lower deposit/loan ratio. 7 The annual real GDP growth data for this variable are taken from 7 In terms of the loan/asset ratio, faster economic growth may lead to growth in the denominator beyond loans, such as government debt and corporate bonds. However, as loans are more risky, higher short-to long-term and demand deposit to time deposit ratio means that the bank faces a greater liquidity risk, which should lead to a higher bank reserves ratio, a lower loan/asset ratio, and a higher deposit/loan ratio.
I control bank assets in the firm-level regression to make sure that the results are not driven by differences in bank size using a natural logarithm for normality. There is no theory to predict whether bigger banks will be more or less prudent, but given that banks differ markedly in size the controlling of this variable should determine whether an effect could be identified. Table 1 shows the annual firm-level data and macro data regression variables that are specified in (1) and their descriptive statistics.
Firm-level regression results
I use firm-level panel data from 1985-2004 with three dependent variables to
explain the portfolio characteristics of the state-owned and joint-equity banks. The results in Table 2 show that the bank dummy is the most robust variable in explaining bank prudence measures. In most of the regressions with the three dependent variables and a different complement of independent variables, the bank dummy is significant at the one-percent level and has the correct sign. This means that joint-equity banks tend to hold more reserves than state-owned banks，and to have higher deposit/loan ratios and lower loan/asset ratios, which are an obvious sign of greater prudence.
State-owned banks have a less efficient system of corporate governance, and tend to be less concerned with liquidity risk and default risk and more eager to disburse loans.
The only two regressions in which the bank dummy is not significant are the bank excess reserves regressions 3 and 4. When bank assets are added into the regressions, the bank dummy becomes insignificant, whereas the new control variable -bank assets -is negative and significant at the one-percent level in both regressions. This can be explained by the correlation between the bank dummy and bank assets, which is -0.718 and significant at the one-percent level. All four state-owned banks are big banks, whereas all of the joint-equity banks are medium-sized or small banks. The negative coefficient of bank assets suggests that smaller banks tend to hold greater excess reserves, which indicates that joint-equity banks tend to be more prudent, a result that is coincident with my hypothesis. In the loan/asset ratio and deposit/loan ratio regressions, the inclusion of bank assets does not make the bank dummy insignificant, and the high correlation suggests this result to be robust. The list dummy seems to have little explanatory power, and is not significant in the loan/asset ratio and deposit/loan ratio regressions. It is significant in the excess reserves regression, but has the incorrect sign. It can thus be concluded that listed banks are not necessarily more risk averse than the other joint-equity banks. So I follow Berger et al (2005) and others focusing on ownership.
GDP growth also seems to be a good explanatory variable for bank portfolio allocation, especially when I control for the ratio of short to long deposits. This indicates that during an economic boom, banks tend to hold less reserves and lend more. The performance of the two interest variables is not satisfactory, and they seem only to explain bank excess reserves well. I discuss this further in section 5.
The ratio of short to long deposits appears to explain the change in the loan/asset ratio and the deposit/loan ratio very well, which indicates that when the liquidity risk is greater, banks with more short-term deposits and less long-term deposits tend to disburse fewer loans. However, the short/long deposit ratio fails to explain bank excess reserves, giving a significant result but with the opposite sign. This may be a consequence of the absence of 99 values from the short/long deposit data, or of the definition of the variable, as I discuss in section 2.
To identify the change in the prudential behavior of the state-owned banks, I run a regression on a sub-sample that includes only the state-owned banks. The dynamic change measure of state-owned bank* time has the correct sign as hypothesized, and is significant in five of the six regressions for all three dependent variables, and in four at the one-percent level. These fairly robust results support the theory that the reform of the banking system has improved the incentive for state-owned banks to behave more prudently, and paints a positive picture of the last 20 years of banking reform in China, which, due to the accumulating non-performing loan problem, is often viewed negatively. However, the result does not mean that the state-owned banks have solved their corporate governance problem and now display rational behavior; indeed, the significant bank dummy coefficients demonstrate that they are still significantly less prudent than the joint-equity banks. Nevertheless, viewed dynamically, the state-owned banks are showing a sustained improvement.
The credit quota dummy is not significant in any of the three regressions. This may be because since the credit quota of the state-owned banks was cancelled in 1998, they have been better able to constrain their loan-extending attitude. Entry to the WTO seems to have induced higher loan/asset ratios and lower deposit/loan ratios, but has had no significant effect on excess reserves. As China's banking market would not be fully open for five years, I am cautious about these results.
One may turn to a social view of state ownership to explain the difference in bank prudence, in that state-owned banks may be trying to maximize broader social objectives. In addition, it must be remembered that the joint-equity banks were just come into being early in the sample period, and thus the dominance of the state-owned banks, which might be insensitive to interest rates, may cause the interest variables to be insignificant. To test these ideas, I shrink my sample to the period Table 2 ) are quite close to those for the sample period 1984-2004, and the bank dummy is again significant at the one-percent level in most of the regressions. As policy loans were split off from the state-owned banks during the 1994-2004 period and the state-owned banks were supposed to start operating like "real banks," the results seem not to support the social view. 9 The real 9 I use bank excess reserves, the loan/asset ratio, and the deposit/loan ratio as measures of bank prudence. Social objectives may lead state-owned banks to lend to SOEs, but there is no theory as to why such ratios would be affected. Furthermore, as the largest shareholders of joint-equity banks are usually SOEs, they also suffer from political interference. These factors lead me to support the corporate governance view.
1994-2004. The results (shown in
excess reserves interest rate and interest rate spread are still not good explanatory variables.
Macro data regression results
In this section, I use the quarterly data from the Chinese banking sector to explain the difference in the portfolio characteristics of the state-owned and joint-equity banks.
The data are for all four state-owned banks and all joint-equity banks, respectively, and the empirical results are shown in Table 3 . Coincident with the annual firm-level data, the bank dummy is significant in all cases at the one-percent level, even after I control for bank fund source characteristics, macro variables, and regulatory variables, and has the correct sign. It is again the most powerful explanatory variable for the bank allocation and prudence measures of bank excess reserves, loan/asset ratio, and deposit/loan ratio. In the regressions of state-owned bank*time, it is significant at the one-percent level in the loan/asset ratio and deposit/loan ratio regressions, and has the correct sign. However, it is insignificant in the bank excess reserves regression. I believe that this is driven by the change in China's money market. China began to develop an organized money market in 1996 through the establishment of a national inter-bank lending market, and, in 1997, an inter-bank bond market. Both markets have flourished, and have given China's commercial banks increasing numbers of money market instruments from which to choose as a secondary reserve. This explains why I find no significant response from reserves to the better management of state-owned banks over time.
When I put more independent variables in the regressions of all three dependent variables, there is a considerable rise in the coefficients of the bank dummy variable.
For the bank excess reserves regression, the coefficient increases from 0.654 in the first regression to 1.538 in the last regression; for the loan/asset ratio regression it increases from -0.743 to -2.763; and for the deposit/loan ratio regression it increases from 0.358 to 2.816. The coefficient of state-owned bank*time follows the same pattern. This means that the other independent variables to some extent mask the effect of bank ownership on bank prudence and the change in prudence of the state-owned banks. Figure 2 clearly shows that the state-owned banks tend to have much larger demand deposit to time deposits, which means that the joint-equity banks should have much lower bank excess reserves and deposit/loan ratios and much higher loan/asset ratios. This is directly contrary to that which is depicted in Figure 1 , which indicates that the difference in prudence between the state-owned banks and the joint-equity banks is much more serious than Figure 1 shows.
Excess reserves interest rate also seems to be a very good explanatory variable, being significant in most of the regressions at the one-percent level with the correct sign. This shows that a higher excess reserves interest rate can successfully induce banks to hold more reserves, and when the excess reserves interest rate is lower, banks tend to lend more based on their total assets or deposits. In China, this is understandable. In the United States and most other countries, the central bank does not pay interest on reserves, whereas China has traditionally paid a fairly high interest rate on bank reserve. The excess reserves interest rate is not significant in the firm-level regressions, but this may be due to the variance in the behavior of the banks in the firm-level panel data, such as different banks having different attitudes toward changes in the excess reserves interest rate. However, on the whole state-owned banks and joint-equity banks do respond to changes in the excess reserves interest rate.
Interest rate spread performs well in the bank excess reserves regressions, but is not as robust as excess reserves interest rate. As is discussed in section 3, China has been loosening its control over bank interest rates, and as the restrictions for commercial banks are diminishing, the official interest rates that are set by the PBOC are no longer a good way of calculating the interest rate spread. The two deposit component proxies are both very good exogenous variables, as is also the case with the firm-level regression results, and are significant in most of the regressions and have the correct sign. If the total deposits of a bank consist of a greater proportion of demand deposits, then the bank will hold more reserves to mitigate deposit runs, and will also disburse fewer loans based on its assets and deposits. Consistent with the discussion in section 2, demand deposits as a proportion of time deposits seems to work better as a measure than short deposits as a proportion of long deposits. The two regulatory variables show the same results in the macro data regressions as in the firm-level regressions.
The results for GDP growth seem to be less robust. This may be because I use real GDP data in the firm-level regressions, but no quarterly real GDP data are available.
5.Conclusion
This paper focuses on the relationship between bank ownership and bank prudence in China, which is seldom discussed even as a general topic, and uses bank excess reserve, loan/asset ratio, and deposit/loan ratio as proxies of bank prudence. Through the carefully selection of dependent and independent variables, I have tried my best to reduce the effects of poor data quality, with the result that the empirical annual firm-level panel data and quarterly macro data results are all fairly robust. Joint-equity banks tend to have higher excess reserves, higher deposit/loan ratios, and lower loan/asset ratios, which shows that they are significantly more prudent than the state-owned banks. However, although their level of prudence is incomparable with that of the joint-equity banks, the state-owned banks have been carrying out fairly efficient reforms and are becoming more prudent as a result. Many people have criticized the state-owned banks for simply being producers of non-performing loans, but the empirical results that are reported in this paper offer a more positive view.
GDP growth, excess reserves interest rate, and bank fund source characteristics are also found to affect bank portfolio allocation. However, whether the reform of the state banking system without privatization will eliminate the identified difference in prudence with the joint-equity banks remains an open question, and as China has only four state-owned banks and eleven main joint-equity banks, the relatively small sample that this affords may affect the results. st at e-owned j oi nt -equi t y
This figure shows the difference in prudence between China's state-owned banks and joint-equity banks. The data are for the aggregate of all state-owned banks or all joint-equity banks, respectively; (a) shows that the state-owned banks have lower bank excess reserves ratios than the joint-equity banks; (b) shows that the state-owned banks have higher loan/asset ratios; (c) shows that the state-owned banks have lower deposit/loan ratios. st at e-owned j oi nt -equi t y
This figure shows that the state-owned banks generally have higher demand deposit/time deposit ratios than the joint-equity banks, and therefore should have higher bank excess reserves ratios and deposit/loan ratios and lower loan/asset ratios. This figure differs markedly from Figure 1 , and indicates that the difference in the level of prudence between the state-owned banks and the joint-equity banks is much more serious than Figure 1 shows. 
WTO
The data are annual firm-level data for each state-owned and joint-equity bank in the period 1985 to 2004. The dependent variables are bank excess reserves ratio (panel A), loan/asset ratio (panel B), and deposit/loan ratio (panel C). Regressions 1-4 are conducted on the whole sample; regressions 5-7 are conducted on the sub-sample of the period 1994-2004, which contains only data after the policy loans were split off from the state-owned banks in 1994, and regressions 8-9 are conducted on a sub-sample that contains all of the state-owned banks for the period 1985-2004 only. The coefficients are standardized. Bank dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 for state-owned banks and 1 for joint-equity banks. List dummy is a dummy that takes the value 1 if a bank is listed and 0 otherwise. Bank assets are input in the form of a natural logarithm. Credit quota is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for state-owned banks after 1998 (as China abolished the credit quota for state-owned banks on January 1, 1998) and 0 for state-owned banks before 1997 and joint-equity banks. WTO is a dummy that takes the value 0 for the years before 2001 (the year of China's accession to the WTO), and 1 for the years after 2002. State bank*time is the number of years since 1985.
Observations vary due to missing data. The functional form is OLS. The t statistics are in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. The data are macro quarterly data on state-owned banks and joint-equity banks between 1993 and 2004. The dependent variables are bank excess reserves ratio (Regressions 1-4), loan/asset ratio (regressions 5-8), and deposit/loan ratio (regressions 9-12). The coefficients are standardized. Bank dummy takes the value 0 for state-owned banks and 1 for joint-equity banks. Reserves interest rate is the excess reserves interest rate. Demand/time is the demand deposit/time deposit ratio. Short/long is the ratio of short-term to long-term deposits. Credit quota is a dummy that takes the value 1 for state-owned banks after 1998 and 0 for state-owned banks before 1997 and joint-equity banks. WTO is a dummy that takes the value 0 for the years before 2001 and 1 for the years after 2002. State bank*time is the number of quarters since March 1993. The functional form is OLS. The t statistics are in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
